



RICK SNYDER
GOVERNOR

STATE OF MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
LANSING



MAURA D. CORRIGAN
DIRECTOR

September 28, 2012

Mr. Doug Ringler, Director
Office of Internal Audit Services
Office of the State Budget
George W. Romney Building
111 South Capitol, 6th Floor
Lansing, Michigan 48913

Dear Mr. Ringler:

In accordance with the State of Michigan, Financial Management Guide, Part VII, the Department of Human Services is enclosing a summary table identifying the responses and the corrective action plans to address recommendations identified in the Office of the Auditor General's Performance Audit of the Application Controls of the Bridges System for the period of September 2009 through June 2010. The responses and corrective action plans were developed in conjunction with the Department of Community Health and the Department of Technology, Management and Budget.

Questions regarding the summary table or corrective action plans should be directed to Cindy Osga, CGFM, at osgac@michigan.gov or 517-335-4087.

Sincerely,

Signature Redacted

Maura D. Corrigan

c: Executive Office
Office of the Auditor General
House Fiscal Agency
Senate Fiscal Agency
House and Senate Appropriation Sub-Committees
House and Senate Standing Committees
Department of Community Health
Department of Technology, Management and Budget



State of Michigan
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
Response to the Auditor General's Report
Performance Audit of the Application Controls of the Bridges System
OAG Reference No. 431-0591-10
DHS Reference No. 2010-251

1. Findings Agreed With – Corrective Action Implemented

1, 2a, 2b, 2d, 3c, 3d, 4a, 4b

2. Findings Agreed With – Corrective Action Will Be Action Implemented

2c

3. Findings Agreed with In Part – Corrective Action Implemented

3a, 3b, 3e

4. Findings Agreed with In Part – Corrective Action Will Be Implemented

None.

5. Findings Agreed with In Part – No Corrective Action Will be Implemented

None.

6. Findings Disagreed With – No Corrective Action Will be Implemented

None.

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View Audit 2010251 Finding 01 - 9/24/2012

Audit Title	BRIDGES-APPLICATION CONTROLS (OAG)		
Auditing Agency	OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL	Begin Date	9/1/2009
Report Issuance Date	10/28/2010	End Date	6/30/2010

Finding Description	Deceased Clients		
Administration Area	PROJECT FINANCING		
Report Implementation Date	6/1/2011	Status Requested	
Status Contact	weberh	Last Updated	9/21/2011
Status	Completed	Last Updated By	weberh

Corrective Action Plan	<p>Finding No. 1: Deceased Clients DHS and DCH, in conjunction with DTMB, did not periodically match all Bridges client records to other data sources to identify deceased clients. As a result, assistance payments may be issued to deceased individuals.</p> <p>DHS did not comply with BAM 808 which states that DHS must match client data to other data sources to verify client eligibility. The manual states that a quarterly match to SSA records must be completed to identify deceased individuals. The purpose of the match is to assure that client data is accurate and benefits issued to recipients are appropriate.</p> <p>DCH implemented a process to match its Medicaid and medical assistance clients from CHAMPS to the SSA records system and DCH vital records system to identify and inactivate the deceased clients' eligibility to Medicaid and medical assistance programs on Bridges. However, the departments did not implement matches for any clients in 34 Medicaid and medical assistance programs, and 11 cash assistance programs with SSA records or DCH's vital records.</p> <p>The departments stated they have manual processes to identify deceased individuals and have implemented an edit to prevent a case worker from entering a new client in Bridges if the clients' age is over 120 years old. However, the audit identified 226 clients over the age of 120, ranging in age of 121 to 311 years old. After this matter was brought to management's attention, the departments immediately took action to review the cases of the 226 clients.</p> <p>Although the audit highlighted 226 clients over 120 years old who are potentially deceased, there may be more clients in Bridges who are coded as living but are in fact deceased. The departments should implement processes to match all Bridges client records to vital records and verify that all clients are coded correctly as living or deceased.</p> <p>Response: DHS, DCH, and DTMB agree with the finding. An automated match process was not incorporated into the initial Bridges application design.</p> <p>Corrective Action Plan: A death match process with DCH Vital Records is in the final test phase to include all programs. After implementation of the death match process, all deceased clients, including those not presently coded as such in the system, will be identified to prevent the possibility of invalid benefit issuance.</p> <p>System functionality requires the worker to validate a client's age if it is 120 years or more. In addition, when DCH closes a Medicaid case due to a client death, the DHS worker receives an alert to run eligibility on all programs in Bridges associated with that client.</p> <p>Monitoring Activities: The testing progress of the Vital Records interface is monitored in weekly testing meetings and in Bridges Release Planning meetings.</p> <p>Actions Taken for Deficiencies Cited in the Finding: DHS reviewed the cases of the 226 clients and found they were not receiving benefits.</p> <p>Anticipated Implementation Date: June 1, 2011</p> <p>Update 08/2011: A death match with DCH Vital Records was implemented in January 2011.</p> <p>Barriers: None</p>
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	<p>Responsible Administration: DHS, Office of Technology and Project Services DTMB, Agency Services DCH, Bureau of Medicaid Program Operations and Quality Assurance</p> <p>Responsible Individual(s), Name(s), Title(s): Teresa Spalding, Director, Office of Technology and Project Services, DHS Jim Hogan, Information Officer Supporting DHS, DTMB Terry Geiger, Director, Customer Service Division, Bureau of Medicaid Program Operations and Quality Assurance, DCH</p>
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Recoupment Recommended	N/A
Recoupment Comments	
OIA Status	Approved
OIA Comments	

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View Audit 2010251 Finding 02a - 9/24/2012

Audit Title	BRIDGES-APPLICATION CONTROLS (OAG)		
Auditing Agency	OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL	Begin Date	9/1/2009
Report Issuance Date	10/28/2010	End Date	6/30/2010

Finding Description	Data Edits-Master Client Data		
Administration Area	PROJECT FINANCING		
Report Implementation Date	7/1/2011	Status Requested	
Status Contact	weberh	Last Updated	9/21/2011
Status	Completed	Last Updated By	weberh

Corrective Action Plan	<p>Finding No. 2a: Data Edits – Master Client Data DHS and DCH, in conjunction with DTMB, did not ensure the integrity of master client data. Bridges master client data such as name, date of birth, gender, race, social security number, and inactive indicator is contained in several Bridges tables. Master client data that is included in multiple tables should be consistent among tables. The following deficiencies were identified in the audit:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. There were data inconsistencies for 7,266 clients including client last name, date of birth, gender, race, social security number, and inactive indicator data fields. As a result, Bridges screens displayed incorrect and inconsistent client data. For example, one Bridges screen indicated that a client was male, but another Bridges screen indicated the same client was female. 2. There were missing client records between two major client data tables. There were 90 clients included in the data collection individual table that were not included in the master client index table. Client records should be included in both tables because Bridges uses the information from both tables during the registration process to determine if an individual is already an existing client. <p>Response: DHS, DCH, and DTMB agree with the finding.</p> <p>The departments agree that master client data should be complete and consistent among different tables within Bridges. DHS and DTMB will investigate the cause of the inconsistencies between the data tables and correct such inefficiencies, as necessary.</p> <p>Corrective Action Plan: The scenario under which the updates are missing in the MCI database is still under investigation. A data modification is needed to update DC_INDV table to mark these individuals as inactive. The discrepant IDs were created in DC_INDV through SWSS web services. DC_INDV and MCI database tables are to be in sync.</p> <p>Monitoring Activities: End user testing will determine if system modifications have corrected the deficiency.</p> <p>Actions Taken for Deficiencies Cited in the Finding: DHS validated that the individual IDs are not active either in Bridges or SWSS and are not receiving benefits in Bridges. A work request has been submitted for the missing updates in the MCI (BRGUS00259493).</p> <p>Anticipated Implementation Date: June 1, 2011</p> <p>Update 08/2011: The data modification identified in the corrective action plan was completed and end user testing determined that the modification corrected the deficiency.</p> <p>Barriers: None.</p> <p>Responsible Administration: DHS, Office of Technology and Project Services DTMB, Agency Services DCH, Bureau of Medicaid Program Operations and Quality Assurance</p> <p>Responsible Individual(s), Name(s), Title(s): Teresa Spalding, Director, Office of Technology and Project Services, DHS Jim Hogan, Information Officer Supporting DHS, DTMB Terry Geiger, Director, Customer Service Division, Bureau of Medicaid Program Operations</p>
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	and Quality Assurance, DCH
Recoupment Recommended	N/A
Recoupment Comments	
OIA Status	Approved
OIA Comments	

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View Audit 2010251 Finding 02b - 9/24/2012

Audit Title	BRIDGES-APPLICATION CONTROLS (OAG)		
Auditing Agency	OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL	Begin Date	9/1/2009
Report Issuance Date	10/28/2010	End Date	6/30/2010
Finding Description	Data Edits-Same Social Security Number		
Administration Area	PROJECT FINANCING		
Report Implementation Date	6/1/2011	Status Requested	
Status Contact	weberh	Last Updated	9/21/2011
Status	Completed	Last Updated By	osgac
Corrective Action Plan	<p>Finding No. 2b: Data Edits – Same Social Security Number DHS and DCH, in conjunction with DTMB, did not prevent Bridges from recording the same social security number for multiple clients. Bridges data was analyzed based on social security number, client last name, client first name, date of birth, gender, and race to determine if a social security number was recorded in Bridges for more than one active client. The audit identified 232 social security numbers that were recorded for more than one active client. The departments should ensure that each client has a unique social security number recorded in Bridges.</p> <p>Response: DHS, DCH, and DTMB agree with the finding.</p> <p>Corrective Action Plan: The social security number enumeration process was modified within the Bridges application in July 2010. The enumeration process uses information provided by the client (e.g., name, date of birth, social security number) which is entered into Bridges and compares it with SSA information to determine if the social security number is valid. The specialist must validate discrepancies reported from SSA to ensure the correct social security number is entered into Bridges. Prior to July 2010, any discrepancies from the SSA match resulted in an automated change within Bridges without worker intervention to validate the SSA information, resulting in errors as identified in the finding. In addition, DCH's CHAMPS system rejects any duplicate social security numbers. The duplicate social security numbers are included on a Member Level Error Report that is sent to DHS for follow up and resolution.</p> <p>Monitoring Activities: Duplicate social security numbers are included on a Member Level Error Report that is sent to DHS from DCH for follow up and resolution. OTIM reviews and makes corrections as needed.</p> <p>Actions Taken for Deficiencies Cited in the Finding: DHS is resolving the discrepancies identified in the finding. Actions will be taken as appropriate.</p> <p>Anticipated Implementation Date: Correction of the duplicates to be completed by June 1, 2011 (BRGUS00259491).</p> <p>Update 08/2011: Corrective of the duplicates was completed on March 14, 2011.</p> <p>Barriers: none</p> <p>Responsible Administration: DHS, Office of Technology and Project Services DTMB, Agency Services DCH, Bureau of Medicaid Program Operations and Quality Assurance</p> <p>Responsible Individual(s), Name(s), Title(s): Teresa Spalding, Director, Office of Technology and Project Services, DHS Jim Hogan, Information Officer Supporting DHS, DTMB Terry Geiger, Director, Customer Service Division, Bureau of Medicaid Program Operations and Quality Assurance, DCH</p>		
Recoupment Recommended	N/A		
Recoupment Comments			
OIA Status	Approved		
OIA Comments			

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View Audit 2010251 Finding 02c - 9/24/2012

Audit Title	BRIDGES-APPLICATION CONTROLS (OAG)		
Auditing Agency	OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL	Begin Date	9/1/2009
Report Issuance Date	10/28/2010	End Date	6/30/2010
Finding Description	Data Edits-Multiple ID Numbers		
Administration Area	PROJECT FINANCING		
Report Implementation Date	3/1/2013	Status Requested	9/13/2012
Status Contact	weberh	Last Updated	9/19/2012
Status	Open	Last Updated By	weberh
Corrective Action Plan	<p>Finding No. 2c: Data Edits – Same Social Security Number DHS and DCH, in conjunction with DTMB, did not implement data edits to prevent a client from having multiple individual ID numbers. Bridges data was analyzed based on social security number, client last name, and date of birth to determine if any clients had multiple active individual ID numbers recorded in Bridges. The audit identified 1,091 clients with more than one active individual ID number in Bridges. Clients should be assigned only one unique individual ID number to prevent the client from receiving duplicate benefits.</p> <p>Response: DHS, DCH, and DTMB agree with the finding.</p> <p>Corrective Action Plan: A Monthly Potential ID Merge Report is being developed that identifies potential instances in which more than one active individual ID number is erroneously created for a single client.</p> <p>A work request (BRGUS00259490) has been submitted for analyzing functionality to identify potential duplicate IDs based on social security number, name, and date of birth.</p> <p>Monitoring Activities: Using the Monthly Potential ID Merge Report, DHS procedures will require the worker to follow-up and correct any occurrence of multiple IDs within 15 days of receiving the report.</p> <p>Actions Taken for Deficiencies Cited in the Finding: Client IDs have been corrected for 801 individuals to date; the remaining 290 are being reviewed and corrected.</p> <p>Anticipated Implementation Date: June 1, 2011.</p> <p>Update 08/2011: There are twenty-seven client IDs remaining to be reviewed. The review should be completed by December 31, 2011.</p> <p>Update 02-2012: The review has been completed. The work request was submitted and awaits prioritization by executive management.</p> <p>Update 09-2012 Work request scheduled for implementation 02/2013.</p> <p>Barriers: none</p> <p>Responsible Administration: DHS, Office of Technology and Project Services DTMB, Agency Services DCH, Bureau of Medicaid Program Operations and Quality Assurance</p> <p>Responsible Individual(s), Name(s), Title(s): Teresa Spalding, Director, Office of Technology and Project Services, DHS Jim Hogan, Information Officer Supporting DHS, DTMB Terry Geiger, Director, Customer Service Division, Bureau of Medicaid Program Operations and Quality Assurance, DCH</p>		
Recoupment Recommended	N/A		
Recoupment Comments			
OIA Status			
OIA Comments			

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Audit Title	BRIDGES-APPLICATION CONTROLS (OAG)		
Auditing Agency	OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL	Begin Date	9/1/2009
Report Issuance Date	10/28/2010	End Date	6/30/2010
Finding Description	Data Edits-Rejection of Invalid Data Values		
Administration Area	PROJECT FINANCING		
Report Implementation Date	6/1/2011	Status Requested	
Status Contact	weberh	Last Updated	9/21/2011
Status	Completed	Last Updated By	osgac
Corrective Action Plan	<p>Finding No. 2d: Data Edits – Rejection of Invalid Data Values DHS and DCH, in conjunction with DTMB, did not ensure that Bridges contained data edits to reject invalid data values in certain data fields. Invalid data was found in the following fields: race code (1844 records), application status code (2 records), and type of assistance (98 records). The departments stated that some of the invalid race data was transferred from other internal systems and was valid data in the other systems, however, the data values were not defined in Bridges.</p> <p>Response: DHS, DCH, and DTMB agree with the finding.</p> <p>Corrective Action Plan: As noted in the finding, DHS identified the cause of the erroneous data values within the race code field. The erroneous data in this field does not impact client eligibility or benefits. The SWSS and Bridges race code tables were synched in March 2010. The data in this field will be corrected during case updates by the worker.</p> <p>DHS determined that the data errors related to type of assistance resulted from incorrect programming that remained in the Bridges application from when the system was being developed in another state. DHS determined that no benefits were issued to clients in error as a result of this programming error. The generation of an invalid type of assistance will be corrected with coding changes (BRGUS00259431).</p> <p>The creation of the invalid application status will be corrected with coding changes (ER BRGUS00259434)</p> <p>Monitoring Activities: The coding changes will be monitored through the Bridges Planning Release process and testing. Data modification will be monitored through the Break/Fix reports.</p> <p>Actions Taken for Deficiencies Cited in the Finding: As noted in the corrective action plan, race codes have been synched and will be updated as the worker updates a case, and the invalid application status codes will be corrected with data modification. It should be noted, the errors cited in the report did not cause benefits to be issued erroneously.</p> <p>Anticipated Implementation Date: June 1, 2011</p> <p>Update 08/2011: The type of assistance programming error was corrected December 8, 2010.</p> <p>Barriers: None</p> <p>Responsible Administration: DHS, Office of Technology and Project Services DTMB, Agency Services DCH, Bureau of Medicaid Program Operations and Quality Assurance</p> <p>Responsible Individual(s), Name(s), Title(s): Teresa Spalding, Director, Office of Technology and Project Services, DHS Jim Hogan, Information Officer Supporting DHS, DTMB Terry Geiger, Director, Customer Service Division, Bureau of Medicaid Program Operations and Quality Assurance, DCH</p>		
Recoupment Recommended	N/A		
Recoupment Comments			
OIA Status	Approved		
OIA Comments			

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View Audit 2010251 Finding 03a - 9/24/2012

Audit Title	BRIDGES-APPLICATION CONTROLS (OAG)		
Auditing Agency	OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL	Begin Date	9/1/2009
Report Issuance Date	10/28/2010	End Date	6/30/2010

Finding Description	Incompatible Access Rights-Manager or Specialist Updating and Approving Cases		
Administration Area	PROJECT FINANCING		
Report Implementation Date	6/1/2012	Status Requested	9/13/2012 
Status Contact	weberh	Last Updated	9/19/2012
Status	Completed	Last Updated By	weberh

Corrective Action Plan	<p>Finding No. 3a: Incompatible Access Rights – Manager or Specialist Updating and Approving Cases 435 users with the job title of manager or specialist had the inappropriate ability to both update and approve casework. Case update rights allow users to modify client information in Bridges which is used in determining eligibility and benefits. Case updates and approvals should be performed by different individuals to prevent a single individual from both making updates to cases and approving their updates. Requiring independent approval of casework also helps reduce the risk of errors and the risk of users inadvertently concealing improper transactions</p> <p>Response: DHS, DCH, and DTMB agree with the finding, in part.</p> <p>DHS disagrees that managers or specialists were given inappropriate rights. There are situations where a manager (FIM) may need to update case information so benefits can be issued to clients in need. The specialist role (FIS/ES) allows a worker to enter client data into Bridges so eligibility is determined and payments can be issued to eligible clients. The case information is monitored for accuracy and supporting documentation through the supervisor case reads. DHS is completing development of the Daily Transaction Listing Report (SE-010).</p> <p>Corrective Action Plan: The Daily Transaction Reconciliation Report (SE-010) has been developed and is in the testing phase. This report has three parts which will identify (1) each transaction performed by the FIM, (2) a percentage of high risk transactions performed by the specialists, and (3) the number of high risk transactions performed by each individual with the FIS/ES role in Bridges. The local office will be required to review the case records to determine that the transactions identified in part 1 and part 2 of the report are valid and supported with appropriate documentation. The transaction reconciliation must be performed by an individual independent of the transaction.</p> <p>Monitoring Activities: The SE-010 report reconciliation transaction reconciliation will provide a level of assurance that needed documentation is in the case record and the transaction is valid. Noted deficiencies will require follow-up by the local office, and case action taken as necessary. The SE-010 report reconciliation will be signed and dated by the individual(s) performing the transaction reconciliation.</p> <p>Actions Taken for Deficiencies Cited in the Finding: n/a</p> <p>Anticipated Implementation Date: July 1, 2011</p> <p>Update 08/2011: Part 1 of the SE-010 Report, FIM Transactions, will be in place with the October 2011 release. A training wizard will be issued with the release until policy can be published after the first of the year.</p> <p>The anticipated implementation date will be changed to January 1, 2012, as a placeholder to follow-up with the implementation status of Parts 2 and 3 of the SE-010 Report.</p> <p>Update 02-2012: Per Weber e-mail: Move the planned implementation date to June 1, 2012</p> <p>Update 05-2012: Policy will be released in June for Part 1 implementation. Parts 2 and 3 have been submitted in a work order and submitted to executive management for prioritization.</p> <p>Update 07-2012: Local offices were instructed to deactivate the FIS/ES role for FIMs by July 20, 2012. Part 1 of the SE-010 Report, FIM Transactions, is operational.</p>
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UPDATE 09-2012:

The only circumstance in which it is allowable for a FIM/AP Supervisor to have FIS/ES access is when the FIM/AP Supervisor is also the Enhanced Site Support (ESS) contact. Local Office Security Coordinators (LOSC's) can give the FIM's/ the FIS/ES access locally, utilizing the following process. LOSC's may not grant incompatible roles for any other purpose. All FIMs/AP Supervisors that currently maintain the FIS/ES role that are not ESS must have the role removed on or before September 14, 2012. Each FIM transaction performed with the FIS/ES role will be identified on the SE-010 report and will be reviewed by an independent person to ensure it is appropriate.

Process:

- Confirm that the FIM/AP Supervisor is listed on the DHS website under: Enhanced Site Support Network>ESS Contacts. Only FIM's/AP Supervisors designated as ESS Contacts on the website can be given access.
- Complete an Incompatible Role Exception Request (DHS-1029)
- Attach the DHS-1029 to the fully completed and signed DHS-173 prepared by the user (FIM) and supervisor to request the access.
- Sign the DHS-1029 on the LOSC signature line, affirming that the LOSC has confirmed the FIM/AP Supervisor is designated as an ESS contact on the DHS website.
- Obtain the signature of the local office director on the DHS-1029 to affirm the local office director accepts the risk associated with allowing the FIM to have incompatible roles and will be responsible for ensuring that compensating control activity is appropriately completed.
- Maintain the original copy of the DHS-1029 form on file with the DHS-173, available for review upon request.

The Central Office Application Security office will monitor on a regular basis to assure that access has not been granted to any individuals who do not appear on the list of ESS Contacts on the DHS NET.

UPDATE:

Local offices were given a revised deadline of 9/14/2012 to initiate the process described above and remove access from FIM's who did not meet the criteria. Application Security ended access for all FIM's who were not ESS Contacts on 9/19/2012 and will re-review access for FIM's the week of 9/28 and regularly thereafter.

Responsible Administration:

DHS, Office of Technology and Project Services

DHS, Field Services

DTMB, Agency Services

DCH, Bureau of Medicaid Program Operations and Quality Assurance

Responsible Individual(s), Name(s), Title(s):

Teresa Spalding, Director, Office of Technology and Project Services, DHS

Terry Beurer, Director, Field Services, DHS

Jim Hogan, Information Officer Supporting DHS, DTMB

Terry Geiger, Director, Customer Service Division, Bureau of Medicaid Program Operations and Quality Assurance, DCH

Recoupment Recommended	N/A
Recoupment Comments	
OIA Status	Approved
OIA Comments	

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Audit Title	BRIDGES-APPLICATION CONTROLS (OAG)		
Auditing Agency	OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL	Begin Date	9/1/2009
Report Issuance Date	10/28/2010	End Date	6/30/2010
Finding Description	Incompatible Access Rights-Departmental Analysts Updating Case Records		
Administration Area	FIELD OPERATIONS		
Report Implementation Date	10/1/2011	Status Requested	
Status Contact	eaganc	Last Updated	
Status	Completed	Last Updated By	osgac
Corrective Action Plan	<p>Finding No. 3b: Incompatible Access Rights – Departmental Analysts Updating Case Records 18 users with the job title of department analyst had the inappropriate ability to update case records. According to the Civil Service position description, department analysts coordinate and implement the Jobs, Education, and Training plan. Job functions include tasks such as collecting and analyzing program data, preparing local office progress reports, coordinating staff training activities, and communicating and sharing best practices between local offices. These functions do not require these users to update case records.</p> <p>Response: DHS, DCH, and DTMB agree with the finding, in part. DHS believes there are limited situations where departmental analysts working with the JET program require update capabilities so the program can operate with limited staffing resources. JET coordinators may be asked to input information into Bridges non-cooperation screens for cases in an effort to strategically resolve the high number of pending non-cooperation occurrences. This access will be limited in scope and include monthly monitoring. Expanded Bridges access will allow the JET coordinators to input information into the Bridges Non-cooperation screen, but not certify the results; rather the JET specialists will review the Bridges screen and certify the results. This high number of non-cooperation occurrences is the result of Bridges transition, system issues, and the recent loss of many JET staff due to retirements. DHS will evaluate alternative approaches so the proper controls and monitoring activities are in place.</p> <p>Corrective Action Plan: Central office assistance payment specialists will monitor the progress local offices make with the non-cooperation report. As the number of non-cooperation occurrences decrease to a reasonable level, central office administration will identify when the expanded Bridges access should be removed from the JET coordinators.</p> <p>Monitoring Activities: Central office assistance payment specialists will monitor the non-cooperation report progress on a monthly basis. The Office of Technology and Project Services will provide a monthly access report to the Public Assistance Bureau director. This report will show JET coordinators with expanded Bridges access and at which time this access is removed. Continual quarterly monitoring will occur to ensure that all JET coordinators have the appropriate Bridges access.</p> <p>Actions Taken for Deficiencies Cited in the Finding: n/a</p> <p>Anticipated Implementation Date: October 1, 2011</p> <p>Update 08/2011: Local offices are submitting recoupment activity reports on a regular basis.</p> <p>Barriers: none</p> <p>Responsible Administration: Field Services Office of Technology and Project Services</p> <p>Responsible Individual(s) Name and Title: Terry Beurer, Acting Director, Field Operations Administration Teresa Spalding, Director, Office of Technology and Project Services</p>		
Recoupment Recommended	N/A		
Recoupment Comments			
OIA Status	Approved		
OIA Comments			

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View Audit 2010251 Finding 03c - 9/24/2012

Audit Title	BRIDGES-APPLICATION CONTROLS (OAG)		
Auditing Agency	OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL	Begin Date	9/1/2009
Report Issuance Date	10/28/2010	End Date	6/30/2010
Finding Description	Incompatible Access Rights-Input or Approve Case Updates and Post Recoupment Payments		
Administration Area	PROJECT FINANCING		
Report Implementation Date	11/1/2010	Status Requested	
Status Contact	weberh	Last Updated	
Status	Completed	Last Updated By	osgac
Corrective Action Plan	<p>Finding No. 3c: Incompatible Access Rights – Input or Approve Case Updates and Post Recoupment Payments 48 users were inappropriately granted the ability to both input or approve case updates and post recoupment payments. Granting users the ability to input or approve case updates along with the ability to post recoupment payments is a violation of the Bridges application security guidelines which state that these access rights cannot be assigned together.</p> <p>Response: DHS, DCH, and DTMB agree with the finding.</p> <p>Corrective Action Plan: The User Listing Reports (SE-003 series) are weekly and monthly reports that provide a listing of all users by user ID, name, and employee number assigned to the report location. The reports function as a snapshot of user profiles so management can ensure the user account status and access is accurate.</p> <p>Monitoring Activities: The Local Office Reports Manual requires management, or designee, to review the report for their location and reconcile to security forms, remedy requests, or other approved documentation. Management, or designee, must take appropriate action for any needed corrections. The report is to be signed and dated by the individual performing the review.</p> <p>Actions Taken for Deficiencies Cited in the Finding: DHS performed a follow-up with regards to the users identified by the auditors. Access rights were changed for each of the 48 users identified in the finding.</p> <p>Anticipated Implementation Date: n/a - implemented</p> <p>Barriers: None</p> <p>Responsible Administration: DHS, Office of Technology and Project Services DHS, Field Services DTMB, Agency Services</p> <p>Responsible Individual(s) Name and Title: Teresa Spalding, Director, Office of Technology and Project Services, DHS Terry Beurer, Acting Director, Field Services, DHS James Hogan, Information Officer serving DHS, Agency Services, DTMB</p>		
Recoupment Recommended	N/A		
Recoupment Comments			
OIA Status	Approved		
OIA Comments			

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Audit Title	BRIDGES-APPLICATION CONTROLS (OAG)		
Auditing Agency	OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL	Begin Date	9/1/2009
Report Issuance Date	10/28/2010	End Date	6/30/2010
Finding Description	Incompatible Access Rights-Initiate and Approve Manual Benefit Transactions		
Administration Area	FIELD OPERATIONS		
Report Implementation Date	10/1/2011	Status Requested	
Status Contact	eaganc	Last Updated	9/22/2011
Status	Completed	Last Updated By	eaganc
Corrective Action Plan	<p>Finding No. 3d: Incompatible Access Rights – Initiate and Approve Manual Benefit Issuance Transactions 32 specialists and 452 managers had the ability to both initiate and approve manual benefit transactions. Manual benefit transactions allow a user to override the benefit issuance amount calculated in Bridges. A Bridges report is generated weekly which lists manual benefit transactions, but the report does not identify the user who prepared or approved the transaction and is not used to monitor these transactions. Specialists and managers should not have the ability to approve manual benefit transactions that they have initiated.</p> <p>Response: DHS, DCH, and DTMB agree with the finding, in part.</p> <p>Although Bridges does not prevent manual issuances from being approved by the individual who created the benefit, manual issuance transactions are monitored for propriety. The Supplemental Payments Listing Report (SP-270) is issued monthly and identifies each supplemental payment issued by a local office by user. Policy has been issued to require an independent person review selected transactions identified on the SP-270 Report.</p> <p>Corrective Action Plan: Manual issuances will be processed by DHS central office staff as the function was originally intended.</p> <p>Monitoring Activities: Random transactions on the SP-270 report are reviewed for appropriateness within the local office.</p> <p>Actions Taken for Deficiencies Cited in the Finding: Access rights were reviewed for appropriateness. Where the business need did not support the access, the access was modified.</p> <p>Anticipated Implementation Date: October 1, 2011</p> <p>Update 08/2011: Manual issuance functionality was pulled from the local offices as of June 2011. Any case requiring a manual issuance is referred to Central office for the manual issuance to be processed.</p> <p>Barriers: None</p> <p>Responsible Administration: DHS, Field Services DHS, Office of Technology and Project Services</p> <p>Responsible Individual(s) Name and Title: Terry Beurer, Acting Director, Field Services, DHS Teresa Spalding, Director, Office of Technology and Project Services, DHS</p>		
Recoupment Recommended			
Recoupment Comments			
OIA Status	Approved		
OIA Comments			

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View Audit 2010251 Finding 03e - 9/24/2012

Audit Title	BRIDGES-APPLICATION CONTROLS (OAG)		
Auditing Agency	OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL	Begin Date	9/1/2009
Report Issuance Date	10/28/2010	End Date	6/30/2010

Finding Description	Incompatible Access Rights-Register and Update Cases		
Administration Area	FIELD OPERATIONS		
Report Implementation Date	2/1/2012	Status Requested	1/5/2012 
Status Contact	eaganc	Last Updated	2/6/2012
Status	Completed	Last Updated By	eaganc

Corrective Action Plan	<p>Finding No. 3e: Incompatible Access Rights – Register and Update Cases 113 users were inappropriately granted the ability to both update case files and perform one or more client registration functions. Registration functions included registering cases, updating profiles for caseworkers regarding the percentage of cases to be reviewed, and assigning cases to caseworkers. Case file updates and client registrations should be performed by separate individuals to prevent an individual from creating a case and establishing benefits for fictitious clients.</p> <p>Response: DHS, DCH, and DTMB agree with the finding in part.</p> <p>DHS disagrees the users were given inappropriate access rights. DHS reviewed the 113 users and took action where necessary. A number of those users had been given incompatible access rights during the roll-out of Bridges because of the need to process Bridges cases in offices where the Bridges roll-out had not yet taken place. Compensating controls were developed to monitor those activities. There are limited situations, such as the outstationed workers who work in the schools or hospitals, where there is only one caseworker to register and make case updates. These transactions are subject to random case reads as with any case processed by a local office. DHS is developing compensating controls to provide greater levels of assurance that transactions processed by the outstationed workers are reviewed by an independent person to validate case transactions are supported and appropriate.</p> <p>Corrective Action Plan: Compensating controls will be developed for outstationed specialists that register and open cases. Controls may include immediate reassignment of all cases at certification and mandatory percentage of second party reviews at certification for staff that retain the case after certification.</p> <p>Monitoring Activities: Monitoring controls will be developed in conjunction with the compensating controls.</p> <p>Actions Taken for Deficiencies Cited in the Finding: None. Cases are subject to random review.</p> <p>Anticipated Implementation Date: July 1, 2011</p> <p>Update 09/2011: Several options have been evaluated to ensure compensating controls are in place. A final document is expected to be completed by January 1, 2012.</p> <p>Update 01/2012: There are multiple individuals involved with this and Jeff Cook will follow-up where they are with a corrective action plan. Jeff requested an extension to February 1.</p> <p>Update 2/6/2012: DHS has developed compensating controls for out-stationed workers to provide greater levels of assurance that transactions processed by these workers are reviewed by an independent person to validate case transactions are supported and appropriate.</p> <p>Compensating controls include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.Immediate reassignment of the case after certification, whenever possible. These cases are subject to random case reads as with any case processed by a local office. 2.Secondary case review for each case processed by the worker when it is retained by that worker after certification.
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Monitoring will be managed through Bridges. The controls are set up automatically within the Bridges system. DHS knows, if the worker is set up with a 10% secondary review in Bridges, then 1 in every 10 cases will automatically trigger a 1/r to a supervisor for a secondary review and the worker is not technically able to complete certification of the case until a supervisor reviews the case and subsequently approves the review within Bridges.

The reassignment feature is the same as far as that being an automatic process depending upon how the Bridges user profile is set up. So checking their profile yearly will help to ensure that they are set up properly and the controls are applied accordingly.

The Bureau of Technology and Project Services will provide Field Services a report, at least annually, showing staff with the registration and update functions. Field Services will review the report within 10 working days to ensure those staff on the report are outstationed workers which need both the registration and update functions to perform their duties. Actions will be taken as necessary. Field Services will document its review on the report.

A yearly follow-up is considered sufficient given the low turnover of the outstationed workers. If circumstances change, more frequent reporting may be needed.

Reports will be retained for one year.

Responsible Administration:
Field Services
Technology and Project Services

Responsible Individual(s) Name and Title:
Terry Beurer, Director, Field Services
Teresa Spalding, Director, Technology and Project Services

Recoupment Recommended	N/A
Recoupment Comments	
OIA Status	Approved
OIA Comments	

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View Audit 2010251 Finding 04a - 9/24/2012

Audit Title	BRIDGES-APPLICATION CONTROLS (OAG)		
Auditing Agency	OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL	Begin Date	9/1/2009
Report Issuance Date	10/28/2010	End Date	6/30/2010
Finding Description	Access Controls-Disabling User Accounts		
Administration Area	PROJECT FINANCING		
Report Implementation Date	10/1/2012	Status Requested	5/30/2012 
Status Contact	weberh	Last Updated	8/3/2012
Status	Completed	Last Updated By	weberh
Corrective Action Plan	<p>Finding No. 4a: Access Controls – Disabling User Accounts The departments did not have an effective process to disable user accounts when employees no longer required access. DTMB Administrative Guide procedure 1350.40 requires user access controls be modified within 48 hours of an employees' role changing within the organization. The audit identified 289 users who no longer required access because they were departed, retired, on leave of absence, or laid off. Each of the 289 users had user accounts with more than read only access. Failure to remove access when users no longer require access leaves Bridges vulnerable to unauthorized access and changes to client data.</p> <p>Response: DHS, DCH, and DTMB agree with the finding.</p> <p>Corrective Action Plan: The MHR-1017, Job Changes by Action Code Description, is now provided to DHS and DTMB by OHR. The report identifies departures, retirements, leaves of absence, and job changes. This report is reconciled against Bridges and State network accounts biweekly by DHS application security.</p> <p>Monitoring Activities: Security reports have been developed so the security coordinator and local office management can monitor access rights of users. The SE-003/SE-003A Weekly and Monthly User Listing reports provide a listing of each user and identifies the user's access rights. The reports are to be reconciled to relevant documentation to support the access rights. The LOR Manual describes the reconciliation process.</p> <p>Actions Taken for Deficiencies Cited in the Finding: After these matters were brought to management's attention, the departments immediately disabled user accounts where appropriate and input the correct employee ID numbers.</p> <p>Anticipated Implementation Date: August 1, 2011</p> <p>Update 08/2011: Access was disabled for all users identified in the audit.</p> <p>OMIC Update 03/2012: Informed that there are number of users who have retired whose accounts have not been disabled. The finding is reopened so a corrective action plan is developed to address the backlog and what actions will be taken to ensure users are disabled in a timely manner.</p> <p>Update 04/2012: per Weber - expect backlog to be resolved by 06/01/2012</p> <p>Update 5/31/2012 The original approach to resolving the backlog would not have fully resolved the backlog. The following steps will be completed by 9/30/2012: - Produce a report of all staff who have not accessed Bridges within the past 6 months and remove access; - Produce a report of all staff who have departed (changed jobs, left State government, gone on leave of absence or layoff, or left for another department) and match it against all Bridges users and remove access. - Check the forms for departed staff (as defined above) and assure that all staff for whom forms have been submitted are included in the inactivations above.</p> <p>Update 8/3/2012 All staff who have not accessed Bridges within the past 6 months or who were identified on a match against HRMN as departed have been inactivated on Bridges effective August 1, 2012.</p> <p>Responsible Administration: DHS, Office of Technology and Project Services</p>		

	DHS, Field Services DTMB, Agency Services Responsible Individual(s) Name and Title: Teresa Spalding, Director, DHS Office of Information and Technology Management Terry Beurer, Acting Director, Field Operations Administration James Hogan, Information Officer serving DHS, DTMB
Recoupment Recommended	N/A
Recoupment Comments	
OIA Status	Approved
OIA Comments	

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Audit Title	BRIDGES-APPLICATION CONTROLS (OAG)		
Auditing Agency	OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL	Begin Date	9/1/2009
Report Issuance Date	10/28/2010	End Date	6/30/2010
Finding Description	Access Controls-Incorrect State Employee ID Numbers		
Administration Area	PROJECT FINANCING		
Report Implementation Date	8/1/2011	Status Requested	
Status Contact	weberh	Last Updated	9/21/2011
Status	Completed	Last Updated By	osgac
Corrective Action Plan	<p>Finding No. 4b: Access Controls – Incorrect State ID Numbers The departments did not ensure that users had the correct State employee ID number assigned to their Bridges user account. The departments require an employee ID number be entered into Bridges to set up a user account. The audit identified 47 users whose employee ID number in Bridges did not match their employee ID number in HRMN. DHS and DCH should work with DTMB to develop a method to verify the accuracy of the employee ID numbers in Bridges.</p> <p>Response: DHS, DCH, and DTMB agree with the finding.</p> <p>Corrective Action Plan: Employee ID numbers are now verified for accuracy prior to input into Bridges.</p> <p>Anticipated Implementation Date: August 1, 2011</p> <p>Update 08/2011: ID verification has been in place since 2010.</p> <p>Responsible Administration: DHS, Office of Technology and Project Services DHS, Field Services DTMB, Agency Services</p> <p>Responsible Individual(s) Name and Title: Teresa Spalding, Director, DHS Office of Information and Technology Management Terry Beurer, Acting Director, Field Operations Administration James Hogan, Information Officer serving DHS, DTMB</p>		
Recoupment Recommended	N/A		
Recoupment Comments			
OIA Status	Approved		
OIA Comments			